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Abstract. A typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt
policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share. Here we use Euro-barometer survey
data and European elite-study data from 1979 for the Netherlands and Germany to construct
a stochastic model of voter response, based on multinomial probit estimation. For each of
these countries, we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model.
The latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics. The pure
spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a
stochastic function of party positions. We use these models to perform a thought experiment
so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions. We go on to propose a model
of internal party decision-making based both on pre-election electoral estimation and post-
election coalition bargaining. This model suggests why the various parties in the period in
question did not adopt vote maximizing positions. We argue that maximizing expected vote
will not, in general, be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based
on proportional representation.
1. Introduction
Democratic political systems can be distinguished by whether they are based
essentially on proportional or plurality electoral rules, and whether political
parties are strongly disciplined or not (see Table 1).
Most of the polities of Western Europe have electoral systems based on
proportional representation, with relatively disciplined parties. Some of these
polities (such as Austria) only have two parties, but others (such as Finland)
may have five or six or more. In contrast, Britain has a plurality (or first-
post-the-post) electoral system, based on over 600 constituencies, each of
which returns one member of Parliament. Although the House includes at
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least eight parties, the effective number1 is just above two (Schofield, 1997a)
as would be expected from Duverger’s Law (Duverger, 1954, 1984; Riker,
1982; Fedderson, 1992).
The British system is often called a “Westminster style” polity. In con-
trast, the U.S. Congress is based on a plurality electoral system, but (to judge
from the heterogeneity of the voting by its members) the two parties are not
disciplined in the sense that British parties are (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991).
In some of the new democracies (such as Russia) mixed PR and plural-
ity electoral methods have been adopted, and the polity seems to be highly
factionalized and the parties very weak. In Japan, which until recently had
a complex electoral system based on multimember constituencies, the dom-
inant liberal Democratic Party was comprised of at least six factions all of
whose leaders were contenders for the prime ministerial position (Wada and
Schofield, 1996).
To construct a formal comparative politics, it would be desirable to build
a rational choice or game theoretic model that includes (a) a reasonable de-
scription of voters’ choices, (b) a coherent description of the behavior by
political actors in the pre-election context, and (c) a model of the negoti-
ation or bargaining by political actors, in the post-election phase, over the
formation of government. Presumably the type of electoral system would
enter into the calculation of political actors under (b) so that it would be
possible to see clearly the effect of different motivations. Similarly, the effect
of political institutions (such as Congressional committees or cabinet rule)
could be understood more readily, were a general model of (c) available.
Almost all the theoretical work of which we are aware has concentrated
either on pre-election behavior by two candidates under plurality rule, or
on post-election coalition negotiation in multiparty situations (where “multi-
party” means at least three parties). It is clear enough that understanding
“multiparty” competition should also involve calculations made by candi-
dates or parties before the election. This paper will use an empirical analysis
of electoral data from the Netherlands and Germany to argue that the usual
two-party electoral models do not generalize well to multiparty situations.
Instead we argue that a coherent model of pre-election party strategy has to
incorporate both an electoral component and prediction over post-election
coalition possibilities.
We use our model of electoral behavior, together with our account of coali-
tion behavior, to suggest why political competition in multiparty situations
does not lead to convergence of party positions. In particular, our model of
party policy choice emphasizes the heterogeneity of preferred policies within
each party. We argue that the proposed model can in principle be used to
understand the different motivations determining political choice in electoral
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systems based on proportional representation or plurality rule, with or without
disciplined parties.
2. Elections: Models of pre-election choice by parties
The literature on formal models of elections is vast, but we can briefly re-
view the main results of the spatial model using Table 2 as a guide. The
spatial model assumes that political choices are points in a policy space,
W, of dimension w. Each voter i  N has an ideal point, xi  W, and each
candidate, j  K makes a “declaration” j  W. The “electoral data” is then
an n  k matrix ij = jj xi–jjj where n = jNj and k = jKj. In the pure spatial
deterministic model, voter i’s “utility” uij for the choice j is a monotonically
decreasing function of ij. A typical assumption is that uij = –2ij. Voter
choice is given by an n  k matrix X = (Xij) where Xij = 1 (i chooses j) if
jj x i–ljj>jjxi–jjj for l 6D j, and Xij = 0 otherwise. The share of the vote of
party j is then  j(X)() = 1n6niD1 Xij(), (where  = (1...,k) is the vector
of declarations). In two-party deterministic models it is usually assumed that
each candidate desires to win. Thus for example we could assume that the
utility for candidate 1, given X and , is
U1.x/./ D 1 if 1.X/./ > 2.X/./
D 0 if 1 D 2
D −1 if 1 < 2:
In the Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) model, vote maximizing by the
candidates (in the case w = 1 and k = 2) forces each candidate (j) to adopt
the electoral median (or Nash equilibrium) position, j = x 1
2 .nC1/, where the
voter ideal points are ordered x1  x2  ... xn, etc. In the one-dimensional case
this result is robust. Thus, if each candidate has policy preferences (so that 1,
for example, prefers to win with a policy near some bliss point z1, say), then
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Table 2. Models of election
Candidate model Voter model
Deterministic Probabilistic
Office seeking Low dimension Strong convergence
Electoral median Nash equilibrium at
electoral mean,
High dimension when variance is high.
Electoral heart
Policy-seeking Weak convergence Weak convergence for
but possibly to some parties;
Nash equilibrium possible divergence
by small parties
the Nash equilibrium typically satisfies 1 = 2 (Osborne, 1995). The logic
is clear: to implement a desired policy, a candidate still must win. Attempts
to extend the Hotelling-Downs model to the case with k  3, generally find
no pure Nash equilibrium (satisfying j  W for all j  K), even in one
dimension (Osborne, 1993).
The motivation of the candidates in such a multiparty model is usually
taken to be plurality maximization, so candidate j prefers that declaration,
j, which maximizes the differences between  j and  l, for all l 6D j. The
reasoning underlying this assumption is presumably that  j is a proxy for the
power of the political agent, j, and that such an agent wishes to maximize
its power. We shall say that an agent, j, who acts to maximize  j (subject to
some model X of voter behavior) is Downsian. A theme of this paper is that
Downsian behavior need not be “rational” in a more general context.
Attempts to extend the Hotelling-Downs model, with k = 2 but w  2 ran
into the well-known difficulty of “generic” non-existence of a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. (In fact, the formal proof of this comes from results by
McKelvey and Schofield, 1986; and Saari, 1997, on non-existence of a core
in a spatial committee game. We mention these results in the next section.)
This “fact” can be side-stepped either by focusing on mixed strategy Nash
equilibria (Kramer, 1978), or by introducing a more general notion such as
the “uncovered set” (McKelvey, 1986; Cox, 1987). However, the uncovered
set is a concept based on spatial committee voting theory, and it is not entirely
obvious that it is appropriate for modeling elections, even when political
agents are assumed to be Downsian. Below we shall introduce the notion
261
of the electoral and political “heart” (Schofield, 1995a), and argue that it can
be used to understand multiparty competition.
Existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria with Downsian candidates is
much easier to demonstrate when the electoral model (X) is probabilistic or
“stochastic” (see, e.g., Hinich, 1977; Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Coughlin,
1992). There are a number of varieties of such a model, but they all suppose
voter behavior is described by the probability  ij that voter i chooses j. Thus
ij = Prob(Xij = 1), so 6jK ij = 1, for each i. A typical assumption is that
uij = uij + j where j is a “perceptual” error term associated with candidate j
and uij is the spatial utility of i for j. Usually the entries in the error vector 
= (1,...,k) are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid).
The probability  ij is then the probability that uij > uil for all l 6D j. This
condition is simply that
l − j < .2il − 2ij/ for all l 6D j: (1)
If it is assumed that each j is normally distributed, with zero expected
value and variance  2j, then it is possible to compute the distribution of
the random variable  j(X)(), given the electoral model and the vector of
declarations. Since the expectation of Xij is simply ij it follows that the
expectation of the vote share is simply given by E(j)() = 1n6  ij(). As in
the deterministic case, we shall say that a candidate, or agent j, who chooses
j to maximize E( j)(), subject to (1; :::; j−1; jC1,...,k), is Downsian.
In two-party competition a more plausible assumption for party 1 say,
would be to maximize the probability that 1(1,2) exceeds 2(1,2).
Nonetheless, under the independence assumption, these two motivations are
effectively identical (Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook, 1974). A standard
result for k = 2 is that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is strongly
convergent, in the sense that 1 = 2 , both at the mean of the voter ideal
points. As Lin, Enelow, and Dorussen (1996) have recently shown, even when
k  3 there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium at the voter mean (at least in
the case the variance terms  2j , j  K, are sufficiently high). In fact, they show
(for high variance) that each expectation E( j)() is concave in j. Thus the
Nash equilibrium is unique, and is at the “welfare maximum” point, * (so j
=  8 j  K). That is to say, 6iN jj xi – * jj is minimized at the convergent
Nash equilibrium, . However, for low variance, E(j)() may fail concavity
or quasi-concavity. Indeed, Nash equilibria may be divergent or fail to exist.
It would appear that both deterministic and probabilistic models with
Downsian agents are preoccupied with finding convergent Nash equilibria.
This seems strange, since in no political system of which we are aware do
candidate positions display strong convergence. It is true that one can weaken
the degree of convergence in 2-candidate elections, by assuming that candi-
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dates have policy preferences. This is done by assuming that the outcome of a
pair of declarations, (1,2), is a lottery, {(Prob(1),1),(Prob(2),2)} say,
where Prob( j) is the probability that candidate j wins the election. As Cox
(1984) has shown, if each candidate (or party) has a Euclidean preference
based on the party’s preferred point, and is committed to the implementa-
tion of its declared position if it wins, then there is a (non-convergent) pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
As soon as parties have preferred positions, then the validity of the as-
sumption of policy commitment in Downsian models becomes suspect. We
shall come back to this question later.
3. Committees: Models of post-election coalition behavior
In two-candidate elections the formal analysis is over when the election is
over and one party wins. If the candidates are parties and k  3, then the
process of government formation involves creating a coalition (which may or
may not be winning). The early work on European coalition governments was
much influenced by Riker’s (1962) analysis of constant sum voting games and
his notion of minimal winning coalitions. It was soon noticed (Herman and
Pope, 1973) that coalition governments could be minority (lacking a major-
ity) or surplus (with extra partners). This research program then focussed
on coalition negotiation between parties with preferred policies in a one-
dimensional policy space (Axelrod, 1970; de Swaan, 1973). Essentially, these
models implied that the party at the median “legislature” policy would belong
to the government. In fact, one could go further and argue that if parties
were only concerned with policy, then any party at the median position in
the legislature could form a minority government and implement its desired
policy. However, empirical analysis (Taylor and Laver, 1973) suggested that
these one-dimensional models did not provide a satisfactory explanation of
government formation.
During the 1980s however, theoretical work on the spatial “committee”
model of voting (Schofield, 1985) as well as empirical work on party declara-
tions (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl, 1987) suggested that a two-dimensional
analysis of coalition behavior could be fruitful.
To illustrate, Table 3 presents the election results of the 1977 and 1981
elections in the Netherlands.
A coalition of the CDA and VVD formed in December 1977, controlling
77 seats, and lasted 41 months until the 1981 election. (It should be noted that
this coalition took 6 months to form after the May 1977 election.) After 1981,
a brief “surplus” coalition of PvdA, D66 and CDA (with 109 seats) formed
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Table 3. Elections in the Netherlands, 1977 and
1981
Party (acronym) 1977 1981
(Seats)
Labor (PvdA) 53 44
Democrats ’66 (D66) 8 17
Liberals (VVD) 28 26
Christian Dem Appeal (CDA) 49 48
(138) (135)
Communists (CPN) 2 3
Dem ’70 (D70) 1 0
Radicals (PPR) 3 3
Pacific Socialists (PSP) – 3
Reform Federation (RPF) – 2
Reform Pol Ass (GDV) 1 1
Farmers Party (BP) 1 0
State Reform Party (SGP) 3 3
(11) (15)
Total 149 150
and then broke down to a minority, D66, CDA coalition. A new election had
to be called in September 1982.
As described in Laver and Schofield (1990), if the parties do have policy
preferences, and if the space is essentially two-dimensional, then it is possible
for there to be a single “dominant” party at the “core” position. A “core” is
a preferred policy position, z1, for party 1 say, such that no other position, y
say, is preferred by a coalition commanding a majority of the seats. Attempts
to use the spatial committee model have foundered on the difficulty of esti-
mating party positions. The work presented in Budge, Robertson and Hearl
(1987) attempted to use content analysis of party declarations (manifestos)
to estimate party positions. However these estimated positions seemed exces-
sively volatile. In this paper we have used the Euro-Barometer II data (Rabier
and Inglehart, 1981) and the European Political Parties Middle Level Elites
data (ISEIUM, 1983) to estimate party positions (further discussion of these
data is provided in the next section, and in Appendix A. See also Quinn et
al., 1996.) These data allow us to represent the positions of the four major
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Figure 1. Dutch voter and party positions, 1979.
parties in the Netherlands in 1979 in a two-dimensional policy space, W (see
Figure 1).
Assume for the moment that the four positions in this figure are preferred
policy choices for the four parties and that each party, j, has a Euclid-
ean policy preference derived from a utility function of the form Uj(x) =
–jjx–zjjj2 (where zj is its preferred position). Now draw the contract curves
between the three pairs {CDA,VVD}, {PvdA,VVD} and {PvdA,CDA}. Us-
ing the election results of 1977 to determine seat strength, it is very readily
shown that the “core” is empty. To illustrate, the CDA position in Figure 1
can be beaten by a winning coalition of {PvdA,VVD} adopting a position on
their contract curve which is nearer to their preferred positions. This in turn
can be beaten by a position on the {PvdA,CDA} contract curve and this again
can be beaten by a position on the contract curve of {CDA,VVD}. The three
contract curves bound a triangle {CDA,VVD,PvdA} which has been termed
the political “heart” (Schofield, 1993).
It has recently been shown (Schofield, 1997b) that the “heart” H can be
identified with a local version of the uncovered set. If the heart is viewed
as a correspondence H , from the space of all party declarations and voter
behavior, to the policy space, W, then H is lower hemi-continuous. Thus H
admits a continuous selection (Schofield, 1995a). See Appendix C for details.
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To be more specific, given a vector of party positions, , and post-election
weights (seats), we assume that the coalition outcome is a lottery g, namely a
set of government coalitions and associated coalition probabilities, g(X)(),
determined by  and the stochastic electoral model X. Let H(X)() be the
realization of the heart once the electorate has responded to , and let QH
denote all lotteries over H . Then our formal model assumes that the political
outcome, g(X)(), belongs to QH(X)(). As  varies, then g is a continuous
selection from QH . If we impute preferences to political agents then, knowing
g, we may solve the implicit game, g, to deduce Nash equilibria, , to this
game. This is a model of high generality, but of little applicability if we cannot
model party preferences or the electoral response, X, appropriately.
To develop the Dutch example resulting from the 1977 election, we shall
continue with the assumption that the parties are committed after the election
to the various positions in Figure 1, and also suppose that coalitions form to
propose policy points inside the realized heart. Without a core in 1977 the
parties found great difficulty reaching an agreement. In particular the PvdA
and CDA could not find an acceptable compromise. As we have observed,
after months of negotiation the CDA and VVD eventually formed a minimal
winning coalition government.
We see this as providing some degree of empirical justification for the
heart. To pursue the example, we can chart the change in the heart result-
ing from the 1981 election. As Table 3 makes clear, the gain of 9 seats by
D66 meant that the {CDA,VVD} coalition lost its majority (dropping to 74
seats). The heart now contracts to become the triangle {PvdA,CDA,D66}.
It is hardly surprising that this three-party coalition first formed. Nor is it
surprising that it collapsed to the minority {CDA,D66} coalition. The rivalry
between the CDA and PvdA led to a political crisis, to a new election in
September 1982, and to a relatively long-lived coalition of {CDA,VVD}.
Observe that the very small parties in 1977 and 1981 seemed to play no
significant role in coalition bargaining. For this reason we ignore their effect
on elections and coalition bargaining.
Note that if only one dimension (the left-right economic axis) were
relevant in the Netherlands then theory would suggest that the CDA (be-
ing typically at the one-dimensional core) could form a one-party minority
government. To our knowledge, minority governments are very rare in the
Netherlands and tend to be short-lived. This suggests, contra de Swaan
(1973), that one-dimensional models of coalition behavior are inadequate,
at least in understanding Dutch politics.
The concept of the “political” heart, used here to interpret these two post-
election situations in the Netherlands, is clearly based on the spatial theory
of committees, since the heart assumes that the party positions are preferred
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policies, and uses the electoral strength of each of the parties to determine the
pattern of winning coalitions. However, we can use the notion of the heart to
infer something about the motivations of the parties before the elections. It is
apparent that the simple maxim of increasing electoral vote is not adequate.
Although the PvdA was the largest party in 1977, it could not find a coalition
partner with which to form the government. It should also be observed that
the principle of “maximizing electoral vote” ignores attitude to risk by the
parties. In the stochastic electoral model discussed below, our estimates for
the distribution of vote shares for the four parties show that there is a signif-
icant variance. For example, the 95% confidence interval for the number of
seats which would have been obtained by the PvdA in an election in 1979 (as
given by our estimation based on party positions) ranges from 42 to 54.
We shall argue in the next section that no party in the Netherlands could
choose an acceptable policy position, in the period under discussion, so as to
give it a reasonable probability of being at the core. In the absence of a post-
election core, negotiations between the parties were bound to be as difficult
as we have observed they were.
We can contrast this core-less example with one from Germany, also for
1979. Table 4 presents the election results between 1976 and 1982. Figure 2
gives the party positions obtained from ISEIUM (1983) data (see also Appen-
dix A and Martin and Quinn, 1997). Clearly the three parties are almost, but
not quite, colinear. If the positions were colinear, then the FDP would be at the
core. However, Schofield (1986) shows that such a core is “structurally un-
stable”, since small perturbations in party positions destroy the core property.
Nonetheless, it can be inferred that the FDP is pivotal. The “grand” coalition
of {CDU,SPD} was possible, but appears to have had low probability. In
fact the {SDP,FDP} coalition formed in December 1976 and lasted until the
October 1980 election. This was followed by a {CDU,FDP} coalition, which
has persisted to the present. Although the Greens won 27 seats in 1982, it
is clear that they have been effectively superfluous in coalition bargaining,
at least until the present. (This may change after the forthcoming election
[Summer 1998] in Germany.)
Essentially the FDP could pick and choose between the two large parties.
In this simpler situation, there may be some reason for one of the two large
parties to seek a core position. However to be at a “structurally stable” core
in this situation means to command a majority of the seats. Our electoral
model, to be introduced below, can be used to determine whether this is
indeed possible.
We may also compare the two cases of an empty core (in the Netherlands)
or a “structurally unstable core” (in Germany) with the possibility of a struc-
turally stable core. As with the uncovered set, the heart and the core coincide
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Figure 2. German voter and party positions, 1979.
Table 4. Elections in West Germany, 1976, 1980 and 1982
1976 1980 1982
(Seats)
Christian Democrats (CDU)a 243 226 244
Free Democrats (FDP) 39 53 34
Social Democrats (SPD) 214 218 193
Greens (GR) – – 27
Total 496 497 498
aThe Christian Social Union (CSU) seats are included
with the CDU.
when the core is non-empty. The post-election bargaining theory proposed
in Laver and Schofield (1990) and Schofield (1993) suggests, moreover, that
in a two-dimensional policy space, if the core is non-empty and structurally
stable, then it can only be occupied by the “dominant” party (see Schofield,
1995b for the proof, and a more precise definition of “dominant”). To give an
indication of how a structurally stable core may arise, consider an artificial
situation for the Netherlands where we suppose that the D66 is located within
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the {CDA,VVD,PvdA} triangle, and controls 39 seats, with each of the other
three parties controlling 37 seats. It is clear, in this case, that the D66 policy
can be beaten by no other two-party coalition. The analysis provided in Laver
and Schofield (1990) suggests, moreover, that such a dominant party at the
core is likely to form a minority (one-party) government. In contrast, when
a minority government forms that is not based on the core in this fashion,
then it is nearly always short-lived. The best evidence is from Scandinavian
countries: out of 50 governments in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, twenty-
eight were minority, and all but three were associated with core, dominant
parties. The three minority, non-core examples were all short-lived, caretaker
governments.
If a party can control policy and obtain government perquisites from lo-
cating itself at a core, then the logical choice of any party would be to seek
the core position. However, such a strategy is feasible only if that policy
position is acceptable to the elite in the party. Note also that whether a po-
sition is core-like or not depends on the position (and strengths) of the other
parties. Thus maneuvering for the core is much more difficult than simply
maximizing expected vote. Indeed, there may be no core. In particular the
McKelvey-Schofield-Saari results on core existence imply that the core is
typically empty in weighted voting games in three dimensions.
Thus, a “counter-core” strategy by a smaller party could be to introduce
policy dimensions to destroy any possibility of occurrence of a core. How-
ever, for this to be effective the new dimension must be relevant in terms of
the true preferences of the parties and of the voters.
A second possibility, even in two dimensions, is that the underlying elec-
toral response to party positions prohibits any party from advantageously
locating itself at the core. To examine this possibility, we shall construct
a “stochastic” model of voting for the Netherlands and Germany, based on
multinomial probit (MNP).
4. An empirical model of electoral behavior based on pure spatial
theory
Appendix A presents the empirical procedure we adopted to construct indi-
vidual and party ideal points in the Netherlands and Germany. Because of the
way the scales were constructed, a respondent agreeing strongly that “greater
effort should be made to reduce inequality” would be assigned a negative
value, and thus tend to be on the left on the first “economic” dimension.
On the other hand, a respondent in the Netherlands agreeing strongly that
“women should be free to decide for themselves in matters concerning abor-
tion” would obtain a negative score on the second dimension. The second
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dimension thus provides a technique for distinguishing Liberal voters (who
might tend to vote for the VVD) and others who might tend to vote for the
Christian Democratic Appeal. This second dimension in the Netherlands may
be viewed as gauging beliefs on individual liberty, with a large negative value
corresponding to “Libertarian” views.
The second dimension in Germany is slightly different. A respondent with
a high negative value on this dimension would tend to agree strongly that
“greater public control should be exercised over multinational corporations”
but to disagree strongly that “nuclear energy should be developed in order
to meet future energy needs.” We could identify this second dimension in
Germany with “corporatism.” However, for convenience, we shall refer to
this second dimension in both countries as a “social” dimension. The factor
loadings in both countries were renormalized so that 95% of all ideal points
in each dimension lay in the range [–2,+2], with the mean position at (0,0).
Note that although both “policy” dimensions in the two countries might
appear to be correlated, our estimates of the underlying density functions (of
voter ideal points) suggest that voter responses are not highly correlated in
these dimensions. In particular, Figure 2 suggests, for example, that a German
voter may simultaneously approve of egalitarian measures as well as believ-
ing that nuclear energy should be developed and multinational companies
should be relatively unregulated.
By this method we obtain a “profile” (x) = (xi)iN of voter ideal positions,
where each xi represents, in some degree, the economic and social beliefs of
voter i. Using almost identical questions asked of the party elites, and taking
the median of these elite positions (in both dimensions) for each party, we
obtain an estimate of the “profile” of party positions  = (j)jK as given in
Figures 1 and 2. Given the empirical distribution of voter ideal points, we
can smooth this to approximate the underlying density function of the voters’
positions. The backgrounds in Figures 1 and 2 give our estimates of these
densities. The combination of (x) and () gives a data matrix  = (ij)jKiN.
In both countries voting intentions were known, so this gives an array y =
(yij)KN where yij = 1 iff voter i intends to vote for j, and 0 otherwise. The
challenge is to estimate a probability matrix ( ij) given (ij) and (yij), so that
a realization(Xij) of ( ij) is close to (yij). Following the standard assumptions
of the pure spatial probabilistic model described in Section 2, we assume
ij D Prob.uij > uil for all l 6D j/
D Prob.l − j < .2il − 2ij/ V l 6D j/
Let ej = (1–j,...j−1–j, jC1–j,...k–j) be a (k–1) dimensional stochas-
tic variable, with probability density function f and let
1
j
i D ..2il2ij/; :::; .2ik − 2ij//Rk−1:
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Using Equation 1, and conditioning on our assumptions on the implicit





Here the integral is (k–1) dimensional.
The maximum likelihood estimator for X is
L.;6; y/ D IIiIIjTij./Uyij : (3)
Unlike the usual model where the ’s are assumed to be iid, with zero
expectation, we adopt the multinomial probit (MNP) assumption that f is the
multivariate normal N(0,6) with general variance-covariance matrix,6. (For
a discussion of probit models, see Alvarez and Nagler, 1996.)
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques (Albert and Chib, 1993;
McCulloch and Rossi, 1994) were used to estimate 6. The details of our
estimation results for the pure spatial model for the Netherlands and Germany
are reported in Appendix A.
Figure 3 presents our estimate of ( ij) in the case of the Netherlands.
Clearly, our estimation of  ij will depend on the ideal point of voter i and the
location of party j. For example, a Dutch voter with an ideal point anywhere
along the “social” axis and at the left extreme on the economic axis “will
vote” for the PvdA with probability exceeding 0.9. On the other hand, any
voter on the extreme right of the economic axis “will vote” for the VVD with
certainty if near the libertarian extreme on the social axis and “will vote” for
the CDA with probability about 0.8 if near the opposite end of the social axis.
These probabilities make intuitive sense. To illustrate further, Figure 4 shows
the distribution of ideal points of those voters who declared in the survey
that they intended to vote for PvdA. The distribution of these voters has been
normalized to sum to unity. Clearly the distribution is unimodal, with its mode
near the PvdA position.
Obviously enough there are voters whose ideal points are nearer the D66
position for example, yet who intend to vote for the PvdA. Clearly a pure
deterministic model of voting does not suffice. Our estimation would assign
to a voter, with such an ideal point, probabilities of approximately .2 for
D66, VVD, and CDA each, and 0.4 for PvdA. Such an assignment is not
implausible.
Figure 5 shows a similar distribution for the ideal points of “CDU” voters
in Germany in 1979. Appendix B presents our estimation results for a joint
electoral model for the Netherlands and Germany, based on multinomial pro-
bit, using not only the spatial data but also individual characteristics of the
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Figure 3a. Estimates of voter probabilities in the Netherlands for the PvdA and D66.
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Figure 3b. Estimates of voter probabilities in the Netherlands for the CDA and VVD.
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Figure 4. Dutch party and PvdA voter positions, 1979.
voters (derived from the Rabier, Inglehart, 1981, survey), such as occupation
and income, religion, education, size of town of domicile, etc.
To briefly summarize the results, we find in both countries that the -
coefficient of the pure spatial model is statistically significant while the
estimated covariance matrix is significantly different from the iid model. We
also find that the pure spatial model is statistically superior to the joint model
in the case of Germany. For the Netherlands, the joint electoral model is
superior to the pure spatial model. We attempt to account for this result in
the next section.
To illustrate the effectiveness of the pure spatial model, Table 5 compares
the national, the sample, and the “estimated” vote shares for the four parties
in the Netherlands. Since only four parties are considered in the model, we
give approximate values for the share going to each party, computed as a
percentage of the total national vote going to the four parties.
It is clear that the sample shares (based on n = 529) are quite close to the
national shares for the 1977 and 1981 elections. The estimated vote shares
are computed by finding the expected value, E( j), of the vote for each party.
Since vote shares are derived from (Xij) and these are random variables, each
vote share is also a random variable. Empirical histograms for the vote share
of the four parties in the Netherlands are given in Figure 6.
The 95% confidence intervals on the estimated vote shares include the
values for the sample shares for three of the four parties. (See Table N2 of the
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Figure 5. German party and CDU voter positions, 1979.
Table 5. Vote shares in the Netherlands’ elections, 1977 to 1981
Party Share of national voteb Sample share Estimated Optimal
1977 1981 in 1979a sharec share
% % % % %
D66 6.1 12.6 10.4 10.6 11  4
PvdA 38.0 32.4 36.9 35.3 45  3
CDA 35.9 35.2 33.8 29.9 40  3
VVD 20.0 19.8 18.9 24.2 40  3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Based on Euro-barometer sample with n = 529.
b Vote shares are very close to seat shares, because of proportional rep-
resentation. Shares are calculated on the basis of total vote to the four
large parties, using Keesing’s Contemporary Archives.
c Pure spatial model, as described in Appendix A.
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Figure 6. Histograms of estimated vote shares for four parties in the Netherlands (based on
1979 data).
Appendix for details.) The one anomaly to note is that, for the VVD, the na-
tional vote share (approximately 20%) and sample share (18.9%) lie outside
the 95% confidence interval (20.8%, 28%) for the estimated expected vote
share. However, the two empirical vote shares lie inside the 95% confidence
interval of (14.9%, 24.6%) obtained from the joint model. The two models
can be compared by considering Tables N2 and N3 in the Appendix.
Table 6 compares the national vote shares for the three parties in the 1976
and 1980 elections, together with the sample shares and our estimates, for
Germany. Figure 7 gives the empirical histograms of the random variables  j
for each party in 1979 in Germany. The point to note is that 95% confidence
intervals for expected vote shares under the pure spatial model for the three
parties are approximately: CDU (.49, .58), SPD (.34, .46) and FDP (.01, .14).
These confidence intervals are very similar to the confidence intervals for the
joint model (compare Tables G2 and G3 in the Appendix).
Although these estimates do not provide much more information than
the sample, they do allow us to draw conclusions about the electoral con-
sequences were parties to adopt “strategic” policy positions. This we do in
the next section.
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Table 6. Vote shares in Germany, 1976 and 1980
Party Share of national voteb Sample sharea Estimated Estimated
% in 1976 % in 1980 in 1979, % % sharec % shared
CDU 49.1 45.4 51.2 53.2 51.0
FDP 8.0 10.8 5.9 6.3 6.4
SPD 42.9 43.8 42.9 40.5 42.6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Based on Euro-barometer sample with n = 543 in 1979.
b Approximately 320,000 votes (out of over 37 million) for small parties are
not included. These parties were not represented in the Bundestag. Vote
shares are calculated as % of total vote to the three parties. In particular,
the Greens gained 15% of the vote, but no seat in 1980.
c Based on the pure spatial model described in Appendix A.
d Using individual characteristics, as described in Appendix B.
Figure 7. Histograms of estimated vote shares for the three parties in Germany (based on
1979 data).
It is worth noting, however, that the model we have constructed here, based
as it is on the assumption of “stochastic voters”, suggests that the underlying
variation in vote shares is higher than might be supposed from simple analysis
of electoral samples.
5. Models of party behavior derived from the analysis
As we have emphasized, party positions (in the model just described) were
estimated by taking the median of party elite positions. Thus the positions
of the parties are not the same as “declarations” to the electorate. Nonethe-
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less, using these estimates of party positions, we found that the pure spatial
MNP model of voting that we have just presented gives a plausible account
of how Dutch and German voters respond to party positions. Thus we may
assume that these party positions did have an effect on electoral response in
the period in question. We now show that changing party positions would lead
to an increase in expected party vote. Let us suppose that the elite members
of the parties in question had beliefs concerning electoral response that are
compatible with the spatial electoral model just discussed.
Consider the thought experiment where each party, j, considers a possible
change in position from j to a “strategic” position, j, assuming all other
party positions are fixed. Based on our MNP model, we compute the optimal
j, chosen as to maximize expected vote. In the Dutch case the optimal
position for each party is at the electoral mean (that is, at the mean (0,0) of
the sample ideal points). After such a move, our estimates of the vote increase
by significant amounts. Table 5 shows the estimated optimal vote shares for
the four Dutch parties. It indicates that the CDA, for example, could increase
expected vote share by up to 10%, from about 30% to 40%. Had the CDA
positioned itself at the electoral mean in 1977, we estimate that its expected
number of seats would have been 55, rather than 49.2
Why do the parties not move to the electoral center, as predicted by the
Downsian probabilistic model? To continue the thought experiment, suppose
that during the 1977 election, the CDA positioned itself at the electoral mean,
so that it gained 55 seats, instead of 49. Let us assume further that parties
are committed to the positions they adopt. (We provide, below, an argument
for this commitment.) We shall argue that this increase of seats for the CDA
(coupled with the change of declared policy positions) would have adversely
affected the final policy outcome, from the point of view of the CDA elite. To
see this note that even with 55 seats, the CDA position at the mean, (0,0), is
not a core position. In all probability, the CDA would have been obliged to
form a coalition with the VVD. However, if the CDA were required to bargain
from its declared position, then the policy compromise could in fact be further
from its true policy position than the actual 1977 outcome. The same is true
for the 1981 election situation. More importantly, given our estimate of the
stochastic relationship between the CDA position and its share, there is no
CDA position at which the CDA could have expected to gain a straight seat
majority (given our confidence intervals). Moreover, the probability that the
CDA could have occupied the core is essentially zero.
In the same way, a thought experiment involving the PvdA suggests that
it could have won approximately 60 (4) seats in the 1981 election, by
moving to the origin. If the PvdA were obliged to commit to that position,
then it would indeed be at a core with high probability and possibly able
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to form a minority government. Now compare the situation in 1981 if the
PvdA declares its “true” position in contrast to the outcome resulting from
the PvdA at a core position at the origin. In the former case there is a sig-
nificant probability of a {PvdA,D66,CDA} coalition in which the PvdA can
presumably affect policy. On the other hand, at the core the PvdA may be
able to implement a minority government, control all the perquisites, but be
obliged to implement a policy far from its ideal position. It is not implausible
that the PvdA party elite would prefer to declare the party’s “true” position
(we explore this somewhat further below).
In a situation such as we have described in the Netherlands, we suggest
that there was an insignificant probability that any party could occupy a post-
election core position and implement a policy that it found preferable to the
lottery resulting from a true declaration of preference.
The case in Germany is somewhat different. As we have seen, the FDP
is “almost” at the core position and has been in almost every government
for decades. It could be dislodged from this position were the SPD to move
sufficiently close to the FDP. However, assuming policy commitment again,
this would have obliged the SPD to implement a policy that the elite of the
party would have found highly undesirable.
We infer that if a party adopts a policy position simply to increase the
number of seats that it controls, then this may not increase the power that the
party has to implement desired policy. The willingness of a party to adopt
vote maximizing policies depends, therefore, on the trade-off in its “utility”
function between the perquisites of office and the importance of policy. How-
ever, to determine the optimal position, it would appear that the party must
compute not just the effect of a change of position on its vote share, but must
also consider how that change affects the post-election lottery over the choice
of the coalition government. If there is no policy change that leads to a poten-
tially “dominant” party being at a core position, with significant probability,
then there are plausible arguments to be made that the declarations of a “true”
policy preference is “rational” for such a party.
To make this argument clearer, we need to examine in more detail our
notion of the preferred point, j, of party j. In our estimation, we chose each
party’s point to be at the median (in both dimensions) of the ideal points of
the party elite (using the ISEIUM, 1983, responses of party delegates). To
illustrate, Figure 8 represents our estimate of the density function of the ideal
points of the PvdA delegates. Comparing Figure 8 with Figure 4 (showing
PvdA voter ideal positions), it is clear that the PvdA delegate variance is much
less than PvdA voter variance. It is reasonable to suppose that the PvdA has
some leeway in declaring a pre-election position to the electorate. However, it
is also obvious that the party cannot choose any position at will. If we view the
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Figure 8. Empirical distribution of estimated ideal points of PvdA delegates (based on 1979
Dutch data).
PvdA delegates as a committee, then it is almost certain that an internal PvdA
core will exist (under majority decision-making by the delegates). This “in-
ternal” party core will lie at the (two-dimensional) median of the delegates’
ideal points. It is therefore sensible to regard this “internal” core position as
the party’s ideal point, as we have done in the estimation just discussed.3
Indeed, we can regard this internal party core point as the sincere choice of
the party. Now consider internal party decision-making over the choice of a
policy point to declare to the electorate. Each delegate of the party has an ideal
policy point, as well as beliefs about electoral response and the nature of post-
election negotiation. Thus, each delegate will have a personal choice for the
best response the party can make to the policy positions of the other parties.
It is reasonable to suppose that a delegate’s “best response” is continuous in
the delegate’s ideal point. Since there is a “sincere” internal party core (under
majority rule among the delegates), there will also be an unbeaten choice
among the party delegates for the policy point to offer to the electorate. Such a
point we can refer to as the strategic choice of the party. Clearly, the party may
commit to this position by choosing the leader of the party to be exactly that
delegate whose ideal point coincides with the strategic choice of the party.
Now, consider a situation where each party makes a strategic best response
to the declarations of the other parties. Since the strategic best response will
280
Table 7. Maximizing expected vote
Party Sample “Ideal” “Strategic” Estimated 95%
share point point vote C.I.
D66 10.4 (–0.1, –0.2) (–0.1, –0.2) 10.8 (4.5, 16.5)
PvdA 36.9 (–1.1, +0.0) (–1.1, +0.0) 36.4 (33.0, 40.0)
CDA 33.8 (+0.6, +0.4) (+0.6, +0.4) 32.8 (28.0, 37.0)
VVD 18.9 (+1.2, –0.3) (+1.5, –1.0) 20.0 (16.5, 23.5)
be continuous in the other parties’ positions, standard arguments can be used
to demonstrate existence of a mutual strategic best response, or Nash equilib-
rium. (See Schofield, 1996, for an outline of such an existence proof.) Notice
that this pre-election Nash equilibrium in party positions is credible after the
election, since each party position will be associated with the ideal point of a
member of the party elite. Moreover, this member, the “leader” of the party,
will have every incentive to bargain effectively with other party leaders in
post-election coalition negotiations.
Let us continue with this thought experiment and suppose that the four
parties in the Netherlands had adopted positions that were strategic Nash
equilibria with respect to their beliefs about the electoral response to these
positions, circa 1979–81, and also their beliefs about post-election bargain-
ing. Assume further that the parties’ electoral beliefs are generally compatible
with the model of stochastic voting that we have constructed. If we modify the
parties’ positions to bring the model’s estimated expected vote shares into line
with the 1981 election results, then we have a method to estimate the parties’
declared Nash equilibrium position. Since we have observed an anomaly in
the expected vote share of the VVD, as estimated by our MNP model, this
suggests that we consider a position for the VVD that differs from this party’s
sincere position. If we keep the three other parties at their sincere positions
and move the VVD from its sincere position (+1.2,–0.3) to (+1.5,–1.0), then
(as Table 7 reports) the estimated expected vote share of the VVD drops from
24.2% to 20.0% and the 95% confidence interval for the party’s vote share
changes from (20.8%,28%) to (16.5%,23.5%). This interval now includes the
sample share and the national vote shares of the VVD in the 1977 and 1981
elections. The estimated expected vote shares of the other three parties are
still close to the sample shares.
Of course we have no direct evidence that the VVD did indeed declare a
policy position to the electorate in the 1977 and 1981 elections that was more
radical than its sincere position.
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In our view, the choice between the joint electoral model (as described
in Appendix B) and the pure spatial model (incorporating the VVD strategic
position) depends on the plausibility of a theoretical argument about why a
party such as the VVD could rationally choose to declare a policy point which
is more radical or extreme than its sincere internal core position.
Appendix C gives a stylized argument, adapted from Schofield (1993) and
Schofield and Parks (1996), to show that if post-election coalition formation
is represented as a lottery, then a party such as the VVD could indeed choose a
more extreme position. The point to note about this model of party calculation
is that although the VVD may believe that it would lose a few percent of the
vote by declaring a more radical position, it could also plausibly believe that
it would, in expectation, pull the policy compromises made either with the
PvdA or CDA towards its internal core position.
The suggestion that the VVD adopted a more extreme position also allows
us to make sense of the 1977 attempt by the CDA to form a coalition with
the PvdA. As Figure 1 illustrates, the {CDA,VVD} internal core points are
nearer to each other than the {CDA,PvdA} internal core points, and so the
former coalition might appear more likely. If, however, the VVD had adopted
the more extreme position, as we have suggested, so that a {CDA,VVD}
compromise would favor the VVD, then it would indeed be rational for the
CDA to approach the PvdA first.
Of course, such a strategic declaration by the VVD is inherently risky.
Indeed, it may have opened the way for smaller parties to enter the electoral
fray in 1981, leading to the loss of the {VVD,CDA} majority, and to the
diminution of the attractiveness of the VVD as a coalition partner.
Having argued that our analysis suggests why the VVD may have declared
a more extreme position, we can also add somewhat to our earlier suggestion
that the PvdA and CDA would be likely to declare their true, or internal core,
positions. For example, in the case of the PvdA, the more centrist delegates of
the party would presumably prefer a move by the party to the core position,
hoping for a minority PvdA government. On the other hand, more extreme
delegates of the party would prefer a leader of the party to adopt a position
on the left of the economic dimension, hoping to influence policy through
coalition negotiation.
For both the PvdA and CDA we might expect considerable internal dis-
agreement within these parties, resulting however, in policy declarations
chosen to be compromises close to the sincere policy points of the two
parties.4
The general model we propose emphasizes the heterogeneity of ideal
policy points within each party, j, together with the selection of a leader,
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whose ideal point, zj, coincides with the majority choice of an equilibrium
declaration, j , made by the party elite.
6. Conclusion
Models of elections have generally been based on the “Downsian” assump-
tion of expected vote maximization. The conclusions of such models are at
variance with the observation that parties do not converge to an electoral
center.
The empirical work presented here suggests that a pure spatial electoral
model is quite satisfactory in modeling electoral response to party positions.
The estimation allows us to determine approximately how much party vote
shares would increase as a result of policy convergence to the electoral mean.
Although nominal political power may be increased by such a move, we argue
that the power to implement desired policies need not increase.
For the Netherlands we suggest that the electoral model allows us to distin-
guish between sincere and strategic party positions. In particular, we infer that
the two larger parties adopted policy positions that were close to their sincere,
or internal core, positions. We have also provided an argument to explain
why a small, non-centrist party such as the VVD, could reasonably adopt a
policy position that is more extreme than its sincere policy position. In Ger-
many, on the other hand, we infer that the balance of preferences within each
party leads to the declaration of a policy point close to the sincere, internal
core, of the party. For both countries, our empirical and theoretical modeling
provides an explanation for the evident fact that parties facing proportional
representation systems do not converge to the electoral center.
We argue that understanding political choice in multiparty democracies
can be based on the following research program: (a) build a stochastic elec-
toral model, of the kind we have constructed here, which can be used as a
proxy for the beliefs of the party elite, (b) assume that each party’s declaration
is associated with the position of a member of the party elite, who then bar-
gains with other party representatives using the post-election party strength as
a political resource, (c) model the post-election coalitional bargaining game in
terms of a lottery of expected coalition outcome inside the post-election heart,
(d) solve the internal pre-election party negotiation game over the choice of
party representative and party declaration.
We intend to develop this framework in future research, by rejecting the
usual assumption that each party is a unitary actor, and by studying the re-
lationship between party declarations (or manifestos) and the distribution of
elite ideal points. We also hope to relate this model of internal party choice
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to current work on post-election coalition negotiation (Schofield, Sened, and
Nixon, 1997).
We suggest that the combination of stochastic electoral models of elec-
tions together with spatial committee analysis can provide a theoretically
powerful, and substantively relevant way to understand party dynamics in
multiparty polities based on proportional representation. Although plurality
electoral systems are more difficult than proportional systems to analyse,
it should be possible, in principle at least, to extend the analysis to study
strategic behavior in Westminster style polities. Finally, since the underlying
model involves delegates, it should also be possible to deal with factional
polities without disciplined parties.
By concentrating on elite political actors, instead of parties, it may be
possible to begin to consider the question of the formation of elite groups and
the building of political parties. By this method we may gain a better under-
standing of the differences between the various types of polities mentioned
in the introduction, and contribute to the development of a formal theory of
comparative politics.
Notes
1. The effective number is the inverse of the Herfindahl index of concentration.
2. Note that the “electoral heart” of the sample, and presumably of the entire electorate, is
a very small set lying close to the origin (0,0). The relationship between the “electoral
heart” and the “political heart”, as generated by party positions and weights, is one way
to characterize a multiparty system.
3. Even if the internal PvdA core is empty, the “heart” of the PvdA delegates, viewed as a
committee, will be a very small set centered on this two-dimensional median.
4. Of course, one could fine-tune the electoral model to equate all expected vote shares with
sample vote shares, leading us to infer that all parties “strategize”. This would seem some-
what pedantic, given the margins of error. The indirect evidence for VVD strategizing
persists even if we use the delegates’ mean position rather than the median.
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Appendix A: Spatial model
The Euro-barometer questionnaire (Rabier and Inglehart, 1981) asked seven
questions covering topics such as income distribution, terrorism, nuclear energy,
public control of enterprises, environmental protection, control of multinational
corporations and abortion. Seven similar questions were asked of political elites of
known party allegiance (through the Institut fur Sozialwissenschaft and the Europa
Institute, Universitat Mannheim, 1983). Exploratory factor analysis uncovered two
factors in both the Netherlands and Germany. Tables N-1 and G-1 give the factor
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Table N-1. Factor loadings, The Netherlands
Issue Dimension 1 Dimension 2
Income distribution +.510 (10.86) –0.148 (1.92)
Terrorism –0.232 (4.28) –0.253 (2.51)
Nuclear energy –0.297 (6.74) –
Enterprises +0.526 (12.0) –
Environment +0.306 (7.46) –
MNC +0.612 (12.6) –0.229 (2.42)
Abortion +0.327 (5.56) +0.39 (2.45)
Chi-square over d.o.f. = 1.76. Sample size (n) = 529.
Table G-1. Factor loadings, Germany
Issue Dimension 1 Dimension 2
Economic “Corporatism”
Income distribution .331 (5.8) +0.156 (2.51)
Terrorism 0.351 (6.2) –0.273 (3.73)
Nuclear energy – –0.641 (4.78)
Environment 0.668 (9.1) –0.173 (2.62)
MNC 0.343 (5.71) +0.222 (3.26)
Abortion 0.283 (5.24) –
Chi-square over d.o.f. = 3.11. Sample size (n) = 543.
loadings on the various issues as follows (t-values in parentheses). In Germany, the
question on enterprises was redundant.
Responses to the seven questions (ranging from strongly favor (1) to strongly
oppose (4)) were renormalized to have mean 0, standard deviation 1.
The factor loadings were then used to generate scoring coefficients for each of
the responses for each country. These were combined to give for each voter an ideal
point on the two dimensions. The same technique was employed for the political
elites. Knowing party allegiance we computed the median of the elite for each party
on each dimension. This was used as our estimator for each party’s ideal or “sincere”
policy point.
For reasons of identification of the estimation for the Netherlands we adopted a
variant of the probabilistic model, using the D66 party as a baseline. That is, letting
4 be the estimated position of the D66 party we assumed that realized utility of
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voter i for party j, given (1,...,4), was
uij./ D 0 − .ij/2 C .i4/2 C j for j D 1; 2; 3; and
ui4./ D 4:
Just as in Section 4, Prob (uij > uil for all l 6D j) = Prob(ej < 1ji). Under the usual
assumption of independence of errors it is an easy matter to show that the variance
(l–j) = variance (l) + variance(j) while the covariance terms are cov(l–j,m–j)
= variance (j). In our analysis we used a statistical routine involving Markov Chain
Monte Carlo Simulation and data augmentation, due to Chib and Greenberg (1996),
that did not assume iid errors.
(Technical details can be found in Quinn, Martin, and Whitford, 1997, and Martin
and Quinn, 1997).
To present the results for the Netherlands, we use the code
{PvdA,VVD,CDA,D66} {1,2,3,4}. We define the covariance terms  lm = cov(l–
4,m–4) and the variance terms  2ll = var(l–4).
Table N-2 presents our estimate for these variance, covariance terms, together
with the estimated coefficients 0 (constant) and  (spatial distance).
Note that the model is unchanged if all utility terms are multiplied by a constant.
Thus, to identify the model we assume  211 = 1.0, and present the variance and
covariance estimates in terms of  211.
The logarithms of the marginal likelihood for these pure spatial models are –545
(for the Netherlands) and –506 (for Germany). The Bayes’ factors (Kass and Raftery,
1995) for comparing these models with a null hypothesis (that X is not determined
by the matrix ) gives vanishingly small probability to the null hypothesis.
The estimated 95% confidence intervals strongly suggest that the coefficients, 0
and , are significantly non-zero. Moreover, confidence intervals on the covariance
matrix indicate that the covariance terms are generally not half variance terms (as
would be true under iid).
To present the estimation for Germany, we use the code {SPD,CDU,FDP} =
{1,2,3} and normalize with respect to the FDP. Table G-2 presents our findings.
Again  211 is set at 1.0. Clearly the two variance terms ( 211 and  222) are
dissimilar. It is possible, but not probable, that the covariance term  12 is 0.5.
Appendix B: Individual factors
We also estimated a joint model utilizing the spatial matrix (ij) but involving indi-
vidual and demographic characteristics that were recorded in the Rabier-Inglehart
Survey.
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Table N-2. Estimation results for the Pure Spatial Model in the Netherlands
Posterior SD 95% CI
Parameter Party mean Lower Upper
Spatial distance 0.456 0.120 0.230 0.710
Constant 0.512 0.064 0.391 0.638
Variance-covariance estimates
 211 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
 12 –0.376 0.261 –0.769 0.084
 13 –0.107 0.188 –0.426 0.224
 222 1.012 0.289 0.618 1.546
 23 0.384 0.200 0.092 0.752
 233 0.696 0.248 0.360 1.134




Predicted vote share D66 0.106 0.044 0.038 0.182
PvdA 0.353 0.027 0.309 0.397
VVD 0.242 0.022 0.208 0.280
CDA 0.299 0.027 0.255 0.342
Table N3 records the effect of incorporating these additional characteristics. As
the table shows, estimated vote shares for D66 and PvdA hardly shift. The high
estimated value of the VVD share now drops from 24.2% to 19.5% (close to the
sample share of 18.9%), while the low share for the CDA of 29.9% climbs to 34.9%
(close to the sample share of 33.8%).
The logarithm of the marginal likelihood increases from –545 to –515.
To interpret the increase of log likelihood as we change from the pure spatial
model, to the joint model, we can compute the Bayes’ Factor (Kass and Raftery,
(1995) between the two models. This is simply the ratio of the marginal likelihoods
of the joint and spatial models, and can be computed as exp (–515 + 545) = exp (30)
> 1013. This suggests that the joint model is superior, in a statistically significant
sense, to the pure spatial model. As a comparison of the confidence intervals on the
VVD vote share suggests, the joint model is statistically superior to the pure spatial
model in capturing voting behavior in the Netherlands.
Table G3 records the effects of incorporating the individual and demographic
characteristics in the model for Germany. Clearly, expected vote shares become close
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Table G-2. Estimation results for the Pure Spatial Model in Germany.
Posterior SD 95% CI
Parameter Party mean Lower Upper
Spatial distance 0.239 0.066 0.120 0.377
Constant 1.078 0.228 0.604 1.509
Variance-covariance estimates
 211 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
 12 0.025 0.431 –0.644 0.727
 222 3.735 2.009 1.361 7.942
Sample vote share FDP 0.059
SPD 0.429
CDU 0.512
Predicted vote share FDP 0.063 0.039 0.013 0.136
SPD 0.405 0.038 0.337 0.462
CDU 0.532 0.029 0.486 0.578
to the sample shares. In particular the SPD share increases from 40% to 42.6% (close
to the sample of 42.9%).
The logarithm of the marginal likelihood drops from –506 to –623.
The Bayes’ Factor between the spatial and joint models for Germany is now
exp (–506 + 623) = exp (117) > 1050. This suggests that the pure spatial model is
statistically superior to the joint model in Germany, at least in the period in question.
This is intuitively obvious from the fact that all sample vote shares lie within the
95% confidence intervals of the predicted vote share.
Appendix C: Strategic party choice
Here, we briefly outline the model of post election coalition bargaining, proposed in
Schofield and Parks (1996). Suppose that three parties {A,B,C} have the ideal points
presented in Figure 9, and that the parties are committed to their declarations (in
the manner proposed in the text). For ease of presentation suppose that they believe
that, whatever their declarations, the electoral response will result in party strengths
such that any pair of parties will control a majority. If the parties’ declarations are
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Table N-3. Estimation results for the Joint Model, the Netherlands
Posterior SD 95% CI
Variable Party mean Lower Upper
Spatial distance 0.499 0.065 0.376 0.627
PvdA 0.926 0.252 0.444 1.421
Manual labor VVD –0.714 0.456 –1.699 0.103
CDA 0.239 0.264 –0.274 0.777
PvdA –0.060 0.082 –0.225 0.101
Religion VVD –0.112 0.114 –0.353 0.092
CDA 0.504 0.098 0.339 0.735
PvdA –0.012 0.022 –0.054 0.032
Income VVD 0.049 0.028 –0.001 0.108
CDA –0.010 0.021 –0.052 0.031
PvdA 0.382 0.103 0.179 0.582
Town size VVD –0.131 0.137 –0.427 0.111
CDA –0.046 0.113 –0.279 0.158
PvdA –0.083 0.029 –0.141 –0.028
Education VVD –0.007 0.038 –0.080 0.067
CDA –0.077 0.028 –0.140 –0.026
Constant 0.256 0.239 –0.185 0.767
Variance-covariance estimates
 211 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
12 –0.350 0.265 –0.772 0.104
13 –0.065 0.193 –0.386 0.252
 222 1.782 0.695 0.933 2.948
23 0.564 0.309 0.161 1.107
 233 0.671 0.233 0.380 1.067




Predicted vote share D66 0.108 0.030 0.061 0.161
PvdA 0.347 0.026 0.306 0.389
VVD 0.195 0.028 0.149 0.246
CDA 0.349 0.030 0.301 0.401
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Table G-3. Estimation results for the Joint Model, Germany
Posterior SD 95% CI
Parameter Party mean Lower Upper
Spatial distance 0.295 0.079 0.154 0.466
Manual labor SPD 0.358 0.275 –1.174 0.910
CDU –0.269 0.467 –1.251 0.606
Religion SPD –0.341 0.467 –0.641 –0.015
CDU 0.946 0.393 0.312 1.827
Income SPD –0.023 0.028 –0.078 0.030
CDU –0.056 0.047 –0.154 0.033
Town size SPD 0.096 0.127 –0.154 0.347
CDU –0.594 0.247 –1.146 –0.165
Education SPD –0.068 0.043 –0.015 0.015
CDU –0.117 0.082 –0.286 0.037
Constant 1.843 0.474 0.978 2.835
Variance-covariance estimates
 211 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
 12 0.035 0.379 –0.584 0.670
 222 7.292 4.106 2.442 14.936
Sample vote share FDP 0.059
SPD 0.429
CDU 0.512
Predicted vote share FDP 0.064 0.026 0.026 0.111
SPD 0.426 0.033 0.368 0.481
CDU 0.510 0.029 0.462 0.558
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sincere, then coalition policy outcomes will be a lottery across the “heart” ABC. Let
U(ABC) be the von Neumann Morgenstern utility of party C for this lottery, where
U is derived from the underlying Euclidean preferences of the party. Consider a
possible declaration by party C of the position C0, chosen such that the triangles
{C0,C,B}, {C0,C,A} and {A,B,C} are all equivalent. By symmetry each of these
lotteries occurs with probability, 13 , so the von Neumann utility of party C for the








Figure 9. Strategic party choice
By symmetry again U(ABC)=U(C0CB) = U(C0CA), so U(ABC0) = U(ABC).
If the lotteries are continuous in the declarations, and U is continuous then there
exists a point C00 on the arc [C,C0] which maximizes U. This point C00 is the best
response of party C to the declarations, A and B. Similar arguments show existence
of a Nash equilibrium, namely mutual best responses of A00 by A to B00, C00, etc.
Obviously, the best response C00 by C depends on the assumptions made on the
nature of the lottery. Schofield and Parks (1996) have made specific assumptions on
the nature of this lottery, which permit computation of best response. To illustrate
suppose after the declarations {A,B,C}, that coalition {A,B} chooses as a policy
compromise the mid-point 12 .ACB/ = D, etc., and that coalitions occur with proba-
bility inversely proportional to the distance between coalition members. Thus, when
party C declares position C, then coalition {C,B} chooses the midpoint E = 12 (B+C),
and when party C chooses C0, then the same coalition {C,B} chooses E0 = 12 (C0+B).
It is evident from Figure 9 that the best response by C to {A,B} is a point C00, such
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that the midpoint E00 = 12 (C00+B) minimizes the distance between C and the arc EE0.
Thus best response by C is to adopt a more extreme position than its ideal point.
Under the above assumptions on the coalition lottery, Schofield and Parks show
that with the given configuration of ideal points, parties A and B will converge to
one another in Nash equilibrium, while C will “diverge.” If non-policy portfolios are
added to the calculations, the extent of convergence by A and B will increase, while
C’s divergence will decrease.
To extend this model to the case of heterogeneous preferences within party C, for
example, note that any delegate of the party with an ideal point in a neighborhood of
C will have a best response that is further from the line AB than is their ideal point.
We suggest that such a model of best response accounts for our empirical inference
that the VVD adopted a more extreme strategic position than its ideal, or internal
core, point.
Computation of best response and of Nash equilibrium is highly nonlinear and
can only be analytically computed in simple symmetric situations such as described
by Figure 9. In general, asymmetries in the configuration of the parties’ sincere
choices will become even more exaggerated when the parties adopt best responses
to each others’ positions. These inferences appear to be robust with respect to the
specific assumptions made about the coalition lotteries.

